Introduction
develops a seminal model in which heterogeneous firms face fixed costs of entering monopolistically competitive markets. A popular variation is that of Chaney (2008) , who makes three simplifying assumptions: the underlying distribution of firm efficiencies is Pareto; a global equity fund pays agents equal shares of the profits of firms in all countries; and the measure of potential firms is exogenous. The first two assumptions simply the model, making it analytically tractable. Here, we provide a reinterpretation of the third assumption.
We extend the closed economy span-of-control model of Lucas (1978) to n countries, each requiring a fixed cost to service a foreign market and each populated by agents with Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) love-for-variety preferences. Each agent is endowed with an entrepreneurial talent and one unit of labor. If the agent chooses to operate a firm, he forgoes the wage he could have earned supplying labor. This is equivalent to operating a firm in the heterogeneous-firm model when the fixed cost is one unit of labor. Consequently, the extended span-of-control model and the model developed by Chaney (2008) have identical aggregate equilibrium variables. In the span-of-control model, however, firms are owned by individual agents, so individual income and consumption vary.
In our span-of-control model, trade liberalization generates a change in the distribution of income. The change in firm profits induced by liberalization is passed through to the owner's income. Melitz (2003) focuses on the case where trade liberalization causes more productive firms to expand and their profits to increase and other, less productive, firms to exit the market. In this case, trade liberalization causes income distribution to become more unequal.
There is limited research that uses span-of-control models to analyze international trade. Ma (2015) develops a span-of-control model where, as here, trade is generated by Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. Antras, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) develop a version of the Garicano (2000) model -which can be interpreted as a generalization of the Lucas model -in an international framework to study offshoring. Chaney (2008) assumes that all agents own shares in a global equity fund. We assume, instead, that agents earn only the profits of the firms in their own country. To show that our version of the Chaney model has an equilibrium in which the aggregate variables are the same as in the span-of-control model, we initially impose three assumptions: First, the fixed cost of setting up a firm to produce for domestic consumption is one unit of labor. Second, parameter values are such that any firm that finds it profitable to export also finds it profitable to produce for domestic consumption. Third, the measure of potential firms is equal to the measure of workers. We later generalize these assumptions. The consumer's demand for good  is
A trade model with fixed costs and a fixed measure of potential firms

Agents
where
Homogeneous-good firms
The homogeneous good is produced using the production function 0 0 i i i y a   and sold in competitive markets. Good 0 is freely traded, so
if country i produces good 0. We choose good 0 as the numeraire and set 0 1 p  .
Differentiated-good firms
Country i is endowed with a measure of potential differentiated-good firms, i  . We assume that The firm in country i that produces good  for sale in country j has the production function
Here ij  , is the fixed cost of exporting from country i to country j , and The firm acts as a monopolistic competitor, taking demand ( , ( ), , )
given and choosing its price ( )
by setting
The pricing rule (7) allows us to index a firm by its efficiency ( )
Market clearing and equilibrium
The set of firms that export to country j , ij  , is characterized by a cutoff value, ˆi j x such that
Firms with productivity greater than ˆi j x sell to country j , and firms with productivity less than In each country i the condition that the market for labor clear is
Notice that
is the set of goods consumed in country i , while ii  is the set of goods produced in i .
A span-of-control model with international trade
We generalize Lucas's (1978) span-of-control model to incorporate international trade and imperfect competition. Agent  in country i has a talent for operating a firm, ( ) i x  . More talented agents choose to operate their own firms while less talented agents supply labor to other firms.
Agents
The world economy again consists of n countries, each populated by a continuum of agents of measure i  , each endowed with one unit of labor. Agent  has income ( ) I  and solves a utility maximization problem like (1), except that agents' incomes are heterogeneous. Since the utility function is homothetic, the demand function of agent  for good  is ( , ( ), , ( )) ( , ( ), ,1) ( )
and the aggregate consumption of any differentiated good depends on the aggregate income of individuals, but not on the distribution of this income across agents,
Firms
Homogeneous-goods firms are the same as in the previous model, but differentiated-good producers are different. Rather than the disembodied technologies of the heterogeneous-firm model, we assume that each agent is endowed with a technology that only he can operate by supplying his one unit of labor as part of the management of the firm. This is why we assume that
The firm operated by agent  produces differentiated good  with marginal efficiency ( ) x  , where the distribution of technologies across households is again described by ( )
If an agent operates his technology, he forgoes the wage he would have earned by working for another firm. Since each agent is endowed with one unit of labor, this opportunity cost is i w .
Market clearing and equilibrium
The market clearing condition for the labor market in country i remains the same as (9) in the heterogeneous-firm model. Now 1 In Lucas's (1978) perfect-competition model, an agent's entrepreneurial talent multiplies a production function with decreasing returns to scale in the other factors. In our monopolistic-competition model, the agent's entrepreneurial talent multiplies a production function with constant or increasing returns to scale. The concavity of profits with respect to inputs follows from demand.
is the measure of agents who operate their own firms, the number of entrepreneurs. Their opportunity cost of not working in other firms is the total fixed cost of operating firms for domestic production.
If an agent chooses to become an entrepreneur, he earns
If he chooses to supply labor to another entrepreneur, he earns i w . An agent's income is
.
The cutoff agent is indifferent between operating his own firm and providing labor to another firm:
Agents with talent greater than ˆi i x choose to operate their firms, while individuals with talent less than ˆi i x provide labor.
The heterogeneous-firm model as a span-of-control model
In the heterogeneous-firm model, there are agents and anonymous technologies, whereas, in the span-of-control model, technologies are embodied in the agents. The firm's problem in the heterogeneous-firm model and the entrepreneur's problem in the span-of-control model coincide, and the same set of technologies are operated in both models. Since preferences are homothetic, aggregate consumption expenditures and aggregate trade flows in the two models are identical.
While the aggregate variables are identical in the two models, the agent-level consumption and income in the two models are not. In the heterogeneous-firm model agents own equal shares in operating firms, but, in the span-of-control model, the entrepreneur earns the profits of his firm only. If we wanted to equate the agent-level distribution of income and consumption across the two models, we could randomly assign one technology to each agent in the trade model.
To generalize the assumptions that the fixed cost of setting up a firm is one unit of labor and that the potential measure of firms is equal to the measure of workers, we could simply change ii   . Second, and alternatively, we could require firms to pay the fixed costs of producing for domestic production whenever they choose to export. In this case, losses in producing for domestic production could be covered by profits in exporting, and the cutoff productivity for domestic production, (8), would become 
where ( )
ii ii x  can be negative. Now, the cutoff for exporting from country i to country j would be the maximum of the zero-profit cutoff ˆi j x defined by condition (8) and the cutoff ˆi i x defined by condition (17).
Our span-of-control model easily generalizes to a model in which agents have heterogeneous labor abilities as well as heterogeneous entrepreneurial abilities. Such a model is equivalent to a heterogeneous-firm model with heterogeneous fixed costs.
